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I. INTRODUCTION
Words are the most basic tools of thought. Those who cannot use them
skillfully will be handicapped not only in communicating ideas to others, but
also in defining, developing, and understanding those ideas themselves.1
Strong advocates of liberty insist that freedom of speech enshrines, more
than any other freedom, the liberty of the individual. This is manifest in the
constitutional protection they accord to free speech under the First
Amendment,2 in the emphasis they place on speech as the benchmark of a free
* Professor of Law, Dalhousie Law School, Canada. B.Comm., LL.B., Cape Town;
LL.M., SJ.D., Harvard Law School. This Article was originally written while the author
was Visiting Professor at the University of Wisconsin Law School. The analysis on free
speech is part of a more extensive inquiry into the transformation of rights. The author
acknowledges with appreciation the comments offered on an earlier draft by Gordon
Baldwin, Vaughan Black, Richard Bilder, Alan Brownstein, Neil Komesar, Beverly Moran,
and Jane Schacter and the editorial assistance of Sean Gatien, Michael Feindel, and Steven
Sieker. Research resources were provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council (SSHRCC), the Department of Justice of Canada, and the University of Wisconsin
Law School.
1 YALE UN IrrY, Yale College Program of Study, Fall and Spring Term, 1993-
94, in BULLEN oF YALE UNrVmSrrY at 15 (ser. 7, Aug. 1, 1993).
2 Ile a priori conception of free speech is not only based on the liberal roots of the
First Amendment. It also reflects a zealous belief that the First Amendment provides
exhaustively for freedom of speech, as is apparent from the wording used. For example, the
First Amendment provides that "no one" shall be denied the freedom of speech. See U.S.
CoNsT. amend. I; see also infra note 7. See generally Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and
the Origins of Modern First Amennent Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L.
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society, 3 and in the affirmative relationship they draw between free speech and
the free flow of ideas. 4 Nationalists add that free speech is the cherished
property of a nation borne out of resistance to exploitation. 5 These assertions
are affirmed in a philosophy of free speech that is principled, rooted in natural
law,6 and reflected in the intention of the Framers.7
REV. 719 (1975); Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (1863), in THE AMERICAN
TESTAMENT 119 (Mortimer Adler & William Gorman eds., 1975).
3 See generally Lyle Denniston, Absolutism: Unadorned, and WIthout Apology, 81
GEo. L.. 351 (1992); Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Juisprudence" A Threat to
Liberty, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MoDERN STATE 225, 229 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al.
eds., 1992); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982).
4 See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe... the ultimate good desired is better reached by
free trade in ideas--that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market ....
Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). On the market-place rationale underlying free speech,
see Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). See generally Stanley
Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitmizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.. 1.
5 As Justice Fortas maintained in Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503
(1969), free speech engenders "[a] sort of hazardous freedom-[a] kind of openness-that is
the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who
grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society." Id. at 506-09;
see also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). Charles Fried echoes this nationalistic
sentiment: "It is the strongest affirmation of our national claim that we put liberty ahead of
other values .... [Iln freedom of expression we lead the world." Fried, supra note 3, at
229. On the argument that free speech is "rooted" in the First Amendment which, in turn,
inheres "in this Nation's history and tradition," see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 51 (1919) (Brandeis, I., concurring).
6 Natural law underscores the interpretation of free speech under the First Amendment.
See, e.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring); Pierce v. United States, 252
U.S. 239, 273 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Natural rights philosophy has returned to
the Supreme Court with a vengeance, with the appointment of Justice Clarence Thomas. On
Justice Thomas's resort to natural law precepts, see Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law
Background of the Pivileges or Irmunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV.
J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 63 (1989). See generally Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural
Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.. 907 (1993) (providing five perspectives on
the historical development of natural rights theory). On the transportation of natural law
philosophy to the American states, see, for example, 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONvENTiON OF 1787 at 437 (Max Farrand ed., 1937); Essay of Brutus to the Citizens of
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This Article critiques these assumptions about free speech. It argues that
speech is not free when it undermines the democratic ends of society, nor ought
it be protected when it violates the natural and constitutional law roots upon
which it is founded. The alternative is to recognize that a right of free speech is
accompanied by a responsibility for that speech. That responsibility is part of
the right itself.8 It is also an important way of protecting the right in a
constitutional democracy. 9
The Article is divided into three parts. Part I evaluates the roots of free
speech in a dignitarian and an instrumental paradigm. It then critiques these
roots in light of the minority critique of free speech. Part II evaluates a
communitarian alternative, arguing that it partially addresses deficiencies in
traditional conceptions of free speech.10 Part M advances a transformative
conception of free speech. Using university hate speech codes as an
illustration," it argues that a right of free speech is accompanied by legal
responsibilities for that speech. Drawing from the writings of Wesley
the State of New-York (Nov. 1, 1787), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 372 (Herbert
J. Storing ed., 1981). On the contention that freedom of expression is a natural right, see,
for example, 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1024 (Bernard Schwartz
ed., 1971); 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CoNSTrTUTIoN, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT
PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 499 (photo. reprint 1937) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836).
7 See, e.g., Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP.
CT. REV. 245. Meildejohn once wrote: "I must ... speak not for absolutism in all its
forms, but only for my own version of it." Id. at 246 n.4. But cf LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE
TOLERANT SOCiETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 36-38
(1986); THOMAS i EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(19606.
8 On this responsibility, see infra part V.
9 Despite an intractable libertarianism that, all too often, is imputed to the First
Amendment, this is not apparent historically, nor is it justified today. On the lack of a clear
intent on the part of the drafters of the First Amendment and the virtue of interpreting the
First Amendment dynamically, see Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Tme,
32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 957 (1919). See also ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF
SPEECH (1920). See generally Hamburger, supra note 6. For a famous debate over the
"absolute" nature of the Bill of Rights and freedom of speech, see Konigsberg v. State Bar,
366 U.S. 36, 49-56 (1961); Id. at 56-80 (Black, J., dissenting); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 524 (1950) (Frankfurter, I., concurring). See also JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL.,
CONSTIrUrTIONAL LAW 865-67 (1983); Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 865 (1960); Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment, 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191; Meildejohn, supra note 7.
10 See infra part I.
11 See infra part VI.
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Hohfeld, 12 it proposes that the association between rights and responsibilities
leads to a workable conception of rights and furthers the ends of social
justice. 13
The unifying theme running throughout this Article is that a free and
democratic society depends upon the health of social discourse within it. That
health is fostered by a guarantee of free speech. However, current construals of
that guarantee have failed to promotefree speech in fact. A preferable construal
of the guarantee of free speech is, first, to avoid limiting the right of free
speech to a wholly negative relationship between the individual and the state,
and second, to characterize free speech communally in light of legal
responsibilities that inhere within it.14
II. THE FEIGNED ROOTS OF FREE SPEECH
[Plutting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the
hands of each of us [is based on] ... the hope that use of such freedom will
ulthimatey produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect policy .... 15
Free speech is associated with the bedrock principle, embodied in the
Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights, that everyone has a right to
liberty. 16 Rooted in natural law thought, 17 this principle seemingly traces back
to John Locke's assertion "that every Man hath .... [a] Natural Freedom,
without being subjected to the Will or Authority of any other Man." 18 The
benefit derived is assumed to be a communal good based on "the belief that no
12 Wesley N. Hohfeld, Rights and Jura[ Relations, in PHmOSOPHY OF LAW 308 (Joel
Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter Hohfeld, Rights].
13 See infra part V.
14 For the contrary proposition, that the guarantee of free speech is intended to protect
the individual from the incursions of the state, see UWM Post v. Board of Regents, 774 F.
Supp. 1163, 1169 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Fried, supra note 3, at 229.
15 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (emphasis added); see also EMERSON,
supra note 7, at 79-80.
16 See, e.g., Black, supra note 9. See generally THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
(U.S. 1776).
17 On the natural law roots of freedom of expression, see, for example, HORTENsIUs
[GEORGEHAY], ANESsAYONTHELIBERTYOFTHEPRESS 18-19,38 (1799).
18 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOvERNMENT bk. If, ch. VI, § 54 (Peter Laslett
ed., 2d ed. 1967). On the natural law roots of free speech, see LEONARD W. LEVY,
EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985); David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Free Press
ause, 30 UCLA L REV. 455 (1983). But c Michael T. Gibson, The Supreme Court and
Freedom of Expression from 1791 to 1917, 55 FORDHAML. REV. 263 (1986).
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other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and
choice upon which our political system rests." 19
Locke's natural law conception of free speech is elaborated by a dignitarian
and an instrumental paradigm respectively. The dignitarian paradigm holds that
all persons have a fundamental right to human dignity as a matter of right
reason and that free speech is the fundamental basis of human dignity. 20 The
instrumental paradigm holds that free speech is necessary to promote the free
flow of ideas. 21 The dignitarian paradigm regards free speech as a liberty that
is fundamental in itself.22 The instrumental paradigm protects speech on
account of the benefits it provides society. 23
Both dignitarian and instrumental paradigms are embodied in a negative
conception of liberty, encompassing three elements: (i) the belief that the
individual's right not to have his speech restricted by the state is fundamental in
and of itself; (ii) the belief that the individual's right to speak promotes the
well-being of a free and democratic society; and (iii) the belief that any
19 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added); see also EMERSON supra note 7, at 79-90.
20 On the roots of dignitarian free speech in deontologic liberalism, see Immanuel
Kant, On the Common Saying: 'This May Be True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in
Practice', in KANT'S POLrrICAL WRIINGS 61-92, (Hans Reiss ed., 1970). But see RONALD
DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRiNCiPLE 353-65 (1985); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusncE
31-33 (1971). The moral epistemology underlying the dignitarian paradigm is that it can
consistently be maintained that it is intrinsically wrong to repress the right of free speech
and further that the use of speech is a moral determination for the speaker to arrive at, not
for the state to impose upon that individual. The moral value of free speech is determined a
priori. See infra part II.A.
21 On this instrumental insistence that the democratic ends of society are best served
through a free market-place in ideas, see supra note 4.
22 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.").
23 In objecting to free speech as an "inherent right," Vincent Blasi evaluates speech in
light of its "checking" and "diversity" values. He concludes that both
values rest on assessments of social consequences rather than notions of inherent right.
Both avoid being linked too closely with eighteenth-century rationalism or with other
optimistic philosophies concerning the nature of truth or the inevitability of progress.
Both emphasize the value of speech to the recipient of messages, rather than to the
sender. Finally, both values affirm the significance of free expression, even in a society
in which the processes of communication are seriously distorted by concentrations of
resources and techniques of manipulation.
Vincent Blasi, The Checldng Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 521,554.
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and of itself; (ii) the belief that the individual's right to speak promotes the
well-being of a free and democratic society; and (iii) the belief that any
infraction upon the liberty of the individual gives rise to a slippery slope that
ends in enslavement. 24 The underlying assumption is that liberty, like life, "has
a central place in our shared scheme of values and opinions." 25 "Sacred or
inviolable" in nature, the "deliberate destruction" of that liberty "dishonor[s]
what ought to be honored." 26 The result is an almost religious devotion to the
liberty of speech. Any concerted restraint upon liberty, it is assumed, is to be
"but a short step [from] ... suppression pure and simple." 27 Any move along
the slippery slope towards restricting speech is to undermine democracy
itself.28 The overriding premise is that individual liberty itself constitutes the
democratic good. A constitutional guarantee, "free speech ultimately serves
only one true value ... 'individual self-realization.'" 29  Dogmatically
conceived, it is the "Kantian right of each individual to be treated as an end in
himself." 30
Courts frequently invoke both dignitarian and instrumental paradigms to
protect the liberty of the person. In a range of decisions, from Chicago Police
Dep't v. Mosley and Collin v. Smith32 to Street v. New York,33 they warn that
24 See, e.g., Fried, supra note 3, at 229, 232-37; Redish, supra note 3.
25 RONALD DWORKIN, Im's DOMINION 70 (1993).
26Id. at 74.
27 Fried, supra note 3, at 228.
28 This fear of the regulation of speech is apparent in reaction to governmental action
taken against the American Communist Party in the 1950s. See 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1988)
(commonly referred to as the Smith Act of 1940). See generally Nathaniel L. Nathanson,
Freedom of Association and the Quest for Internal Security: Conspiracy from Dennis to Dr.
Spock, 65 Nw. U. L. REv. 153 (1970). On the conviction of the primary organizers of the
Party, see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). With the weakening of the
McCarthy era, the finding in Dennis was undermined in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S.
298 (1957). See also Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
But see Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
29 Redish, supra note 3, at 593. Harry Triandis, a social psychologist, has observed
that the United States is "among the most individualistic cultures of the world." Harry
Triandis, Cross Cultural Studies of Indvidualism and Collectivism, in 37 CURRENT THEORY
AND RESEARCH MoTIvATION: NEBRASKA SYMPosIuM OF MOTIVATION 41, 44 (John Berman
ed., 1989).
30 Fried, supra note 3, at 233.
31 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
32 578 F.2d 1197, 1206 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
33 394 U.S. 576, 593 (1969).
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any infraction upon free speech will erode democracy itself.34 They reinforce
this claim on grounds of constitutional originalism,35 in light of natural law and
libertarian idealism, 36 and in terms of a marketplace in ideas.37 Insisting that
judges remain neutral towards the content of speech,38 they do not differentiate
34 For example, in insisting that freedom of expression includes the right to burn the
flag, the Court in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), advanced a classical slippery
slope argument:
Could the Government ... prohibit the burning of state flags? Of copies of the
Presidential seal? Of the Constitution? In evaluating these choices under the First
Amendment, how would we decide which symbols were sufficiently special to warrant
unique status? To do so, we would be forced to consult our own political preferences,
and impose them on the citizenry, in the very way that the First Amendment forbids us
to do.
Id. at 417. On the relationship between authoritarianism and restrictions on free speech, see
T.W. ADORNO Er AL., THE AUTHORrrARIAN PESONALrrY (1969).
35 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalsm, The Lesser EvI, 57 U. CiN. L. REV. 849
(1989) (Here, Justice Scalia describes himself as a "faint hearted originalist."); see also
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (Scalia, J.); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973); Rosenblum v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1967); New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). See
generally Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 CoLUM. L. REv. 1321 (1992).3 6 See, e.g., David F. McGowan & Ragesh K. Tangri, A Libertaian Citique of
University Restrictions of Offensive Speech, 79 CAL. L. REv. 825 (1991). Messrs.
McGowan and Tangri add: "Bereft of immutability ... the communitarian view offers no
other criterion for differentiating among the claims of different communities to have their
defining characteristics dressed up in constitutive garb and given the power to suppress
speech." Id. at 866.
3 7 Those who hold this viewpoint ordinarily subscribe to a libertarian marketplace in
ideas. However hostile the exchange between speakers, they believe that the exchange still
produces a greater good, on balance, than would arise in its absence. They also treat any
state infraction upon speech as unbridled totalitarianism. On this marketplace ideology, see
generally Ingber, supra note 4. But cf Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categodcal
Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REv. 671, 729 (1983); C. Edwin Baker,
Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 974-77 (1978).
38 As Robert Bork would have it, a neutral interpretation affirms the principle of free
speech under the First Amendment. See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amenunents Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1 (1971); see also Charles Fried, Liberalism,
Conmnunity, and the Objectivity of Values, 96 HARV. L. REV. 960 (1983) (reviewing
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITs OF JUSTICE (1982)). But .f Felix S.
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 809
(1935); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the 'Hunch' in
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between good and bad speech. 39 Flatly stated by Justice Scalia, in striking
down a hate speech ordinance in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,40 "the [Bias-
Motivated Crime O]rdinance is facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits
otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the [content of] the
speech .. "41
These dignitarian and instrumental paradigms underlying free speech rest
on two false premises. They assume that an individuated right of free speech
inheres in natural law. They suppose, further, that courts ought to be neutral
towards the content of speech so as to preserve an individuated and natural
right to speak. Even proponents of natural law reject these assumptions. They
well appreciate that political society is not neutral towards the content of
speech. They also recognize that political society delineates the nature of
individual liberty in its own interests. In "political society," John Locke clearly
insisted, "every one... hath quitted this natural power, resigned it up into the
hands of the community." 42 Similarly, St. Thomas Aquinas emphasized that
"[t]he object of the Law is the Common Good,"43 while man's "natural
inclination [is] to know the truth about God and to live in society."44
The dignitarian paradigm is also deficient in conceiving of dignity from the
perspective of the speaker, at the expense of the dignity of the target. The result
is social injustice. This injustice is most apparent when speech is used to
silence or invite violence, as when speech is used to silence the voice of
Judicial Decisions, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929). For arguments in favor of comparatively
unqualified right to free speech, well before Fried's articles, see Black, supra note 9. For
general discussion on the judicial duty to decide cases neutrally, see especially HERBERT
WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, PoLmCs AND FuNDAMENAL LAW (1961). See also JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT: A THEORY OFJUDICIAL REvIEw (1980). But cf. Lawrence
Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE LJ.
1063 (1980).
3 9 See supra note 38. For the argument that free speech ought to be protected in
general on account of its checking value, see Blasi, supra note 23. This checking value is
most evident in relation to the freedom of the press. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501
(1984); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). On the attempt by
scholars to limit restrictions on speech to the private, as distinct from the public realm, see
EMERSON, supra note 7, at 105.
40 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
41 Ld. at 2542. But see Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L.
REv. 46 (1987).
4 2 See LocKE, supra note 18, at bk. 11, ch. VII, § 87 (emphasis added).
4 3 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOcA, LAW IN GENERAL qu. 90, art. 2 (Fathers
of the English Dominican Province trans., 1948) (emphasis added).
44 Id. at qu. 94, art. 2 (emphasis added).
[V/ol. 56:899
TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH
difference or provoke conflic. 45 As Justice Holmes expounded in Schenck v.
United States,46 the "question in every case [in which the state regulates
speech] is whether the words used ... create a clear and present danger that
they wdl bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent."47 As a result, some courts decline to guarantee "fighting words" that
likely would provoke retaliation,48 just as they attribute fault to private speech
that is lewd, indecent, profane,49 or libelous. 50 However much dignity the
45 See, e.g., AuDRi LORDE, The Master's Tools Wil Never DLsmande the Master's
House, in SIsTER OursmER 110-13 (1984). On the capacity of the law of libel to empower a
white and male elite, see NoRMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECrING THE BEa" MEN: AN
INTERPRETATIvE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LBEL (1986).
46 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
47 Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
48 For an example of "fighting words" in a campus hate speech code, see the proposals
of the University of Montana's Student Conduct Code Revision Committee, cited in Thomas
Huff, Addressing Hate Messages at the University of Montana: Regulating and Educating,
53 MONT. L. REV. 157 (1992).
"Fighting words" are those personally abusive epithets which, when directly addressed
to any ordinary person are, in the context used and as a matter of common knowledge,
inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction whether or not they actually do so. Such
words include, but are not limited to, those terms widely recognized to be derogatory
references to race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability, and other
personal characteristics. "Fighting words" constitute "harassment" when the
circumstances of their utterance create a hostile and intimidating environment which the
student uttering them should reasonably know will interfere with the victim's ability to
pursue effectively his or her education or otherwise to participate fully in University
programs and activities.
Id. at 162 n.24. For cases on the "fighting words" doctrine, see, for example, infra note 75.
49 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); ef American Booksellers Ass'n v.
Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affid, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). See generally
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, 0vi4 Rights, and Speech, 20 HMV. C.R.-C.L. L.
Ray. 1 (1985); Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy,
and the First Amendment, 76 CAL. L. REv. 297 (1988).
50 See Loren P. Beth, Group Libel and Free Speech, 39 MINN. L. REv. 167 (1955);
David Reisman, Democracy and Defwnadon: Control of Group Libel, 42 CoLum. L REV.
727 (1942); David Reisman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Gwe and Fair Conment II,
42 COLUM. L. REV. 1282 (1942); Note, A Communitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws,
101 HARV. L. REV. 682 (1988); Note, Statutory Prohibition of Group Defiumadion, 47
CoLuM. L REv. 595 (1947). For challenges to the group libel concept, see the dissenting
opinions in Beauharnais v. linois, 343 U.S. 250, 267 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting); id. at
277 (Reed, J., dissenting); id. at 284 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 287 (Jackson, I.,
dissenting). There is considerable argument in ftvor of group libel statutes. See, e.g.,
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individual might acquire from engaging in sexually explicit expression in front
of a post office,5 ' judges sometimes denounce such conduct as "fighting
words"52 that incite imminent lawlessness,53 that vilify public policy, 54 or
simply, that are obscene.55
Kenneth Lasson, Group Libel Versus Free Speech. When Big Brother Should Butt In, 23
DUQ. L. REv. 77 (1984); Kenneth Lasson, Racial Defamation As Free Speech: Abusing the
First Amendment, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 11 (1985); Joseph Tanenhaus, Group
Libel, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 261 (1950); Mark S. Campisano, Note, Group Vilification
Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J. 308 (1979); Note, A Coummunitarian Defense of Group Libel
Laws, supra.
51 See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990). Similarly, judges have
determined whether to uphold restrictions on the right of the NAACP to run a charity drive
in the federal workplace in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S.
788, 800 (1985) (holding that an annual charitable fund-raising drive conducted in the
federal workplace does not occur in a public forum and that expression there is not subject
to the stringent test of protection that applies to speech in public forums). In addition, courts
devise criteria by which to differentiate between public forums in which everyone enjoys
freedom of expression from those in which only some do. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-47 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263 (1981).
52 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942).
53 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
54 See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266-67 (1951). On the vilifying
impact of pornography upon women both as individuals and as a community, see Catharine
MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 321, 337-38 (1984). But see
American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
55 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Courts sometimes rely upon
peripheral arguments to reconcile dignitarian and instrumental paradigms. For example, in
public regulation cases like Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970),
the Supreme Court limited the dignitarian right of the individual to use the post office to
send sexually provocative and pandering advertisements by transforming the threat of public
harm into a property claim. Using a cost-benefit analysis, it determined when the
Government's interest in limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose outweighed
the interest of those wishing to use the property for other expressive purposes. Id. at 738
(holding that the post office could order the publisher to desist from such mailings to the
addresses of complainant recipients); see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988);
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985); Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). Even more explicitly, in Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940), the Supreme Court restricted freedom of expression on grounds that it
constituted a "clear and present danger," not to the victims of such speech, but to "traffic
upon the public streets." Id. at 308. The clear and present danger rule was originally
enunciated by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). See also
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1988); United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F.
Supp. 990, 999 (W.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
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The dignitarian and instrumental paradigms also fail to take account of the
communal nature of liberty. They fail to appreciate that liberty encompasses the
freedom to enjoy a condition of life, beyond the negative right of the individual
to protection from state intrusion. They ignore that communal liberty is
possible only when responsibilities are imposed upon individuals, communities,
and the state not to intrude upon such a condition of life.56 They overlook the
fact that speech interferes most with the democratic process when the defect of
prejudice bars groups subject to widespread vilification from participation in
the political process and causes governmental decision-makers to misapprehend
the costs and benefits of their actions. 57
In conclusion, the dignitarian paradigm relies on an unduly restricted
conception of personhood. Insistent upon the autonomy of the person, it passes
over the extent to which personhood derives from the mutual interdependence
among persons. That interdependence is possible only when the dignity of the
person encompasses the dignity of the target as a condition of social and
political life itself.58
The instrumental paradigm is similarly self-limiting. It trusts in an overly
restrictive marketplace in ideas in which the good derives solely from the acts
of independent right-holders. It ignores the instrumental loss that stems from
speech that seeks to, or has the effect of, disrupting the free flow of ideas.
Most importantly, it restricts the flow of ideas within the democratic state by
declining to distinguish between free speech and speech that abuses free
speech. 59 Jidges who still insist upon an unfettered right of speech experience
a "conflict between the rights of a particular speaker ... and the competing
5 6 See LEoN E. TRAKMAN, REASONING wrTH THE CHARTER, ch. 2 (1991). For a
somewhat comparable view, see Kenneth L. Karst, Equality and Community: Lessons from
the ivil Rights Era, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 183 (1980) [hereinaftr Karst, Equality and
Community]. Professor Karst argues that communities that are abused by other communities
are denied equality, while individuals who are denied equal standing with other individuals
are subject to unequal treatment. Id. at 186-87. See generally Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to
Belonging: The .ConWtuon and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303 (1986) [hereinafter
Karst, Paths to Belonging]; David Sugarman, The Legal Boundanes of Liberty: Dicey,
Liberalism and Legal Science, 46 MOD. L. REv. 102 (1983) (reviewing RICHARD A.
CosGRovE, THE RULE OF LAW: ALBERT VENN DicEY, VICTORIAN JURIST (1980)).
57 ELY, supra note 38; see also Triandis, supra note 29, at 102 (suggesting that such
neutrality is "consistent with a justification of racism through the affirmation of the status
quo."). See generally CHRISTOPHER LAscH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM: AMERIcAN LIFE
IN AN AGE OF DMMSHING ExPECTATIONs 4-5 (1979); JAMES D. HUNTER, CULTURE WARs:
THESTRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMEmCA 135-58 (1991).
58 On this interdependence in communitarian thought, see infra note 106.
59 For challenges to the reliance placed on the free flow of ideas within a mythical
marketplace, see supra note 37.
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interests of the community as a whole," 60 not limited to any one discrete
minority. 61 Judges who treat the rights of the speaker as a necessary means
towards the democratic good overlook speech which threatens that good.
A. False A Priorism
Any challenge to the dignitarian paradigm underlying free speech
necessarily requires that courts reckon with two false assumptions underlying
liberty: that the nature and content of liberty are determined a priori and that
courts ought not to redefine the meaning of liberty ix post.62 Applied to
constitutional law, it is assumed that both the liberty to speak and the content
of that speech have pre-determined meanings. This assumption is doubtful
because it ignores the extent to which the nature and content of liberty are
60 See Ronald Dworkin, Is the Press Losing the First Amendment?, N.Y. REv. BooKs,
Dec. 4, 1980, at 49, 52, quoted in William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost
Guarantee of a Freedom of Eapression, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 91, 93 (1984); see also Frank
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1526 (1988). The competing interests of
the community, arguably, include the interests of discrete minorities to be protected from
the abuse effected by individual rights. As Justice Frankfurter commented in Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1951):
It would... be arrant dogmatism... for us to deny that the... [1]egislature may
warrantably believe that a man's job and his educational opportunities and the dignity
accorded him may depend as much on the reputation of the racial and religious group to
which he willy-nilly belongs, as on his own merits.
Id. at 263. Despite the willingness of the Supreme Court to recognize a group libel action in
Beauharnais, the influence of that decision has declined considerably over the years. See,
e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 82, (1964) (Douglas, I., concurring)
("Beauharnais v. Illinois, ... a case decided by the narrowest of margins, should be
overruled as a misfit in our constitutional system ... ."); see also Anti-Defamation League
of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 174 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969).
61 On the historically unequal treatment of ethnic and racial minorities, see AREND
LUPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLu1AL SocIETIEs: A CoNARATIVE EXPLORATION (1977);
PROTECTIoN OF ETHNIC MiNoRmEs: COMPARATIVE PEn.spEcrxvS (Robert G. Wirsing ed.,
1981); Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities,
66 NOTRE DAm L. REV. 1219 (1991); Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the
aims of Coinmunity, 90 MCH. L. REV. 685 (1992); Lance Liebman, Ethnic Groups and
the Legal System, in ETHIc RELATIONS IN AMERICA 150 (Lance Liebman ed., 1982);
Staughton Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1417 (1984). But see Ronald
Dworkin, Liberal Comnunity, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1989).62 On the a priori conception of free speech, see supra note 2.
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determined ex post. Courts determine the worth of free speech ex post in
asserting that individuated conceptions of free speech ought to prevail over the
alternatives. They protect the right of the KKK to insult African Americans and
Jews only because they place a greater value upon the right to speak than the
social harm that stems from its exercise. 63
In summation, a priori conceptions of freedom of expression fail because
they treat expost consideration of the social effect of speech as irrelevant. They
fail, too, because they ground the liberty to speak in a conceptual permanence
at the expense of functional need. 64
An alternative approach is to conceive of freedom of expression in light of
its impact upon particular communities, for example, upon discrete, insular,
and visible minorities. This is the essence of the minority critique of freedom
of expression.
B. The Minority Critique
I look at myself
and see part of me
who rejects my father and my mother
and dissolves into the melting pot
to disappear in shame.
I sometimes
sell my brother out
and reclaim him
for my own when society gives me
token leadership
in society's own name.65
The most cogent critique of the feigned roots of free speech in an a priori
and individuated liberty is evident in the writings of critical race theorists like
Charles Lawrence, an African American; Richard Delgado, a Hispanic
American; and Marl Matsuda, an Asian American. 66 All three fault the
63 See, e.g., Denniston, supra note 3; Meiklejohn, supra note 7; cf EMERSON, supra
note 7; Blasi, supra note 23.
64 The falsity of this conceptual permanence is most apparent in the doubtful assertion
that the First Amendment gave freedom of expression an immutable character. As
Zechariah Chafee once remarked: "The truth is, I think, that the framers had no very clear
idea as to what they meant by 'the freedom of speech or of the presss' .... " Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., Book Review, 62 HARv. L. RLv. 891, 898 (1949) (reviewing ALEXANDER
MEmFOHN, FREE SP_cH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GovnRNMn~r (1948)).
65 R. GONZALEs, I AM OAQUIN (1972).
66 See Charles R. Lawrence III, ifHe Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech
on Campus, 1990 DUKE L. 431; Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for
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prevailing free speech doctrine on dignitarian and instrumental grounds. First,
racist speech accentuates the disempowerment of those who traditionally were
denied access to power. 67 Second, it perpetuates that disempowerment by
devising institutional, even state-sanctioned barriers to exclude minorities from
the maintream. 68 Third, it reinforces these barriers by drawing a false
continuum between racial differentiation and racial discrimination. 69 Fourth, it
forces minorities either to submit to hatred or mete out hatred in response to
hatred.70 Minorities, who respond to racist taunts likely are accused of engaging
Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 137 (1982);
Mad Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2320, 2358 (1989). On the historical treatment of ethnic minorities, notably as
immigrants to the United States, see CATHERINE SILK & JOHN SILK, RACISM AND ANTI-
RACISM IN AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE (1990); SPLIT IMAGE: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE
MASS MEDIA (Jannette L. Dates & William Barlow eds., 1990); RAYMOND W. STEDMAN,
SHADOWS OF THE INDIAN: STEREOTYPES IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1982); EUGENE WONG, ON
VISUAL MEDIA RACISM: ASIANS IN THE AMERICAN MOTION PICTURE (1978); see also The
King and Osborn, 94 Eng. Rep. 425 (K.B. 1732); GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF
PREJUDICE 400-404 (1979); TAMA STARR, THE 'NATURAL INFERIORITY' OF WOMEN:
OUTRAGEOUS PRONOUNCEMENTS BY MISGUIDED MALES (1991).6 7 See Lawrence, supra note 66, at 459; see also Matsuda, supra note 66, at 2360.
6 8 On the history of organized racism the practices of the KKK, see Christian Knights
of the Ku Klux Klan Invisible Empire v. District of Columbia, 919 F.2d 148 (D.C. Cir.
1990); JOHN D. ALPINE, REPORT ARISING OUT OF THE AcrTivTs OF THE Ku KLux KLAN IN
BRITISH COLUMBIA 30 (1981); ALLEN W. TRELEASE, WHIrrE TERROR: THE Ku KLUX KLAN
CONSPIRACY AND SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCVION (1971); Michael S. Russell, 7he Ku Klux
Klan and the Proper Perspective on the Scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 2 REGENT U. L.
REv. 73 (1992). On the history of racism in the constitutions of particular American states
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see FUNDAMENTAL CONSTrrUTIONS OF
CAROLINA 107 (1669), reprinted in NORTH CAROLINA CHARTERS AND CONSTITUTIONS,
1578-1698, at 132 (Mattie Erma Edwards Parker ed., 1963); MARYLAND ACTS OF
ASSEMBLY I, noted in SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 371-
79 (1968). See generally Michael W. McConnell, America's First 'Hate Speech'
Regulation, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 17 (1992).
6 9 For an excellent description of the fear that the "hierarchical majoritarian variation
of voice" of color might perpetuate this continuum, see John 0. Calmore, Oitical Race
Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a
Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2129, 2170 (1992); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The
New Voice of Color, 100 YALE LJ. 2007, 2015 (1991).
7 0 For a somewhat vehement postulation to this effect, see Derrick Bell, Racisn: A
Prophecy for the Year 2000, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 93 (1989); Derrick Bell & Pretta Bansal,
The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.. 1609 (1988). See also ROGER
DANIELS & HARRY KITANO, AMERICAN RACISM: EXPLORATION OF THE NATURE OF
PREJUDICE (1970); Richard Delgado, Zero-Based Racial Politics and an Infinity-Based
Response: Will Endless Talking Cure America's Racial Ills?, 80 GEo. L.J. 1879 (1992). But
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in reactive racism. 71 Minorities who remain silent are deemed to submit in
racism. The result is indignity and protracted social tension arising from words
that "wound," 72 that reduce minorities to "caricature[s]," 73 or that depict them
as "an untouchable caste, unfit to be educated with white children." 74 Racial
minorities who react to their indignity with "fighting words" cannot win. They
are condemned, even though "fighting words" might "provoke the average
person to retaliation." 75 They are shunned for "breach[ing] ... the peace," 76
even though the "average person" might have acted similarly under comparable
conditions of provocation.77 The result is a pervasive private and public hurt.78
cf. SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN
AMERICA (1990); Stephen Carter, The Best Black, and Other Tales, 1 RECONSTRUCION No.
1, at 6 (1990); Randall 1. Kennedy, Racial Citiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1745 (1989).
71 see, e.g., Berta Blen, Note, To Hear or Not to Hear: A Legal Analysis of Subliminal
Communication Technology, 44 RuTroms L. REV. 871 (1992).
72 See Delgado, supra note 66, at 137; see also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic,
images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy
Systemic Social ils?, 77 CORNELL L. Rav. 1258 (1992); Richard Delgado, Legal
Storytelling for Qppositonists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411
(1989).
73 Lawrence, supra note 66, at 483; see also Matsuda, supra note 66, at 2361-62.
Charles Lawrence argues that "being called 'nigger,' 'spic,' 'Jap,' or 'kike' is like receiving
a slap in the face. The injury is instantaneous." Lawrence, supra note 66, at 452. Richard
Delgado identifies "feelings of humiliation, isolation, and self-hatred" and doubts about
one's self-worth and identity that arises from hate speech. Delgado, supra note 66, at 137.
Patricia Williams calls racist speech "spirit murder." Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering
the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U.
MLAML. REy. 127, 139 (1987).
7 4 Lawrence, supra note 66, at 439. Lawrence is referring here to Brown v. Board of
Educ., 447 U.S. 483 (1954). He elaborates, stating that the Court there "held that
segregated schools were unconstitutional primarily because of the message segregation
conveys-the message that black children are an untouchable caste, unfit to be educated
with white children. Segregation serves its purpose by conveying an idea.... Therefore,
Brown may be read as regulating the content of racist speech." Lawrence, supra note 66, at
439-40; see also William B. Reynolds, Indh'vidualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of
Brown, 93 YALE LJ. 995 (1984).
75 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942); see also R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
76 Qzaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
77 On the subordinating effect of hate speech upon, among others, racial groups, see
Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the Subordination
of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 95; Matsuda, supra note 66, at 2361-63.
78 The state's tacit protection of racist speech is sometimes apparent in the support
governments give to those who wish to preserve racially exclusive zones, restrictive
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In the words of Mari Matsuda, those who "proclaim ... [the] racial
inferiority" of members of racial minorities render the genus "at once... alike
and inferior." 79
The minority critique demonstrates admirably that racist speech is hurtful
in depicting African Americans as a criminal class,80 or blaming them for
declining property values, as was noted by the Court in Beauharnais v.
llinois. 81 Racist speech clearly is offensive when it transforms the roots of
covenants, and white electoral primaries. See MEL V N UROFSKY, A MARCH OF IBERTY: A
CONSTnuTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNrrED STATES 649-51 (1988). The state also tacitly
condones racist speech in refusing to intervene in the interests of discrete minorities who are
excluded, inter alia, from schools, housing projects, and government employment itself. On
the state's involvement in racist speech, see, for example, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726 (1978); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970); Collin v.
Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). See generally
J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralisr.w Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375 (arguing that true freedom of speech cannot occur without
equality of position). On the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court between physical and
emotional harm arising from hate speech, see David Goldberger, Sources of Judicial
Reluctance to Use Psychic Harm as a Basis for Suppressing Racist, Sexist and Ethnically
Offensive Speech, 56 BRooK. L. REv. 1165 (1991). See also Jean C. Love, Discriminatory
Speech and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 123 (1990).
7 9 Matsuda, supra note 66, at 2358. As a further exemplification of the communal
intent and attributes of racist speech, see UWM Post Inc. v. Board of Regents of the Univ.
of Wis. System, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1167-68 (E.D. Wis. 1991). One student was reported
to have said to "an Asian-American student: 'It's people like you-that's the reason this
country is screwed up' and .... '[w]hites are always getting screwed by minorities and
some day the Whites will take over.'" Id. at 1167; see also Doe v. University of Michigan,
721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
80 The imprisonment rate for African American men in the United States in 1988 was
965 per 100,000. The equivalent rate with White men was 155 per 100,000. Kevin Reed et
al., Race, Oiminal Justice and the Death Penalty, 15 WHnTJER L. REV. 395, 396 (1994)
(citing Black, White Incarceration Rules, OVERCROWDED TIMES, May 1991, at 6).
According to national figures, in 1990, 23% of African American men between 20 and 29
were in prison, on parole, or on probation. The equivalent number of White men in that
position was only 6.2%. Sam Meddis, Young Black Generation in Legal Web, USA TODAY,
Oct. 11, 1990, at 3A; see also Sam Meddis, Black Imprisonment Highest in USA; New
Study: Rate Tops S. Africa's, USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 1991, at 2A (asserting that 3 out of 100
African American men in the United States are imprisoned and that this number exceeds the
number of Black South Africans imprisoned in South Africa under Apartheid at that time);
Sharon Shahid, We're Saying If We Don't Try Something New, We Are Doomed, USA
TODAY, Aug. 15, 1991, at 11A.
81 343 U.S. 250, 266 n.21 (1952) (Frankfurter, 1.).
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crime in poverty into a reason to hate those who are poor and black.82 Social
upheaval is also a likely consequence of unrestricted hate. One such upheaval,
Derrick Bell warns, is a simmering race war that transcends the inner cities of
America.8 3
Despite its vivid depiction of reality, the minority critique does more to
describe a social condition than to prescribe a legal remedy. It demonstrates the
extent to which racist speech ferments social upheaval. It does not reconcile
itself to speech that, however critical, is permissible on grounds that it
redresses social tensions. As a result, the minority critique successfully disputes
the majoritarian interest in the right to free speech, but it fails to provide a
medium through which to reconcile the adverse claims of the speaker to
freedom of expression and the target to freedomfrom expression. 84 It also deals
only cursorily with other instances of hate speech, as when words wound
82 See generally GORDONW. ALLPORT, supra note 66; OLWER C. Cox, CASTE, CLASS
AND RACE: A STUDY IN SOCIAL DYNAMICS (1948); HARRY H.L. KITANO, RACE RELATIONS
127-29 (3d ed. 1985); RACE, CLASS, CULTURE IN AMEICA: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES OF
THIRD WORLD AMERCA (L. Shinagawa ed., 1983); GEORGE E. SIMPSON & I. MILTON
YINGER, RACIAL AND CULTURAL MINORIIES: AN ANALYSIS OF PREJUDICE AND
DSCRIMINATION (4th ed. 1972); PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE, RACE AND RACaSM (2d ed.
1978); Darryl Brown, Note, Racism and Race Relations in the Univerty, 76 VA. L. REV.
295 (1990).
83 See, e.g., DERRm'K A. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 1992). See
generally supra note 70.
84 This is not meant to reject the "storytelling" narrative in which minorities
demonstrate that the negative rights of members of mainstream society are preserved at the
expense of minorities. However, this is meant to challenge the view, all too often supported
by some critical race theorists, that extending negative rights to minorities, will even the
balance. My argument is that the negative conception of rights is internally flawed in
excluding alternative conceptions of rights, as well as in denying transformative means of
identifying them. On storytelling, see especially PETER L. BERG & THOMAS LUCKMAN, THE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALrY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLE E (1967);
NELSON GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING (1978); ON NARRATIVE (WJ.T. Mitchell ed.,
1980); PAUL RICOEUR, TiME AND NARRATIVE (Kathleen Blarney & David Pellauer trans.,
1984); Richard Delgado, Legal Storytelling for Oppodionits and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MCH. L. REV. 2411 (1989); Tony M. Massaro, Enpathy, Legal Storytelling,
and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MiCH. L. REV. 2099, 2101-04 (1989).
See also Mar L Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidisaciwnadion Law, and a
Jwisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE LJ. 1329 (1991). For an excellent
argument for the development of rights consciousness along racial lines, see Kimberl6 W.
Crenshaw, Race, Refonn and Retrenchment: Transfornation and Legianmton in
Antdicrirdinaaon Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
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women, religious minorities, and disabled persons for reasons other than
racism.85
An alternative is to conceive of free speech in light of communal
conceptions of liberty, beyond the minority critique. This arises when free
speech is valued according to the communal conditions in which speech is
exercised, including the conditions that affect the parties to each speech
relationship. This approach is inherent in communitarian thought.86
IU. A COMMUNAL LIBERTY
On communal liberty, Charles Taylor states:
But when we think of a human being, we do not simply mean a living
organism, but a being who can think, feel, decide, be moved, respond, enter
into relations with others; and all this implies a language, a related set of ways
of experiencing the world, of interpreting his feelings, understanding his
relation to others, to the past, the future, the absolute, and so on. It is the
particular way he situates himself within this cultural world that we call his
identity.87
A communal liberty identifies two related images of liberty: the liberty to
be different and the liberty to be respected by others on account of that
85 This is most apparent in the writings of Richard Delgado. His primary assumption is
that "words wound"; he does not deal with the fact adequately that the abuse of other
liberties also can wound. On the social upheaval fermented by racist speech, see Crenshaw,
supra note 84; Delgado, supra note 66; Patricia I. Williams, Aicherical Notes:
Reconstnting Ideals from Deconstrcted Rights, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987).
But see John 0. Calmore, Exploring the Significance of Race and Class in Representing the
Black Poor, 61 OR. L. REv. 201 (1982); Gerald Torres, Local Knowledge, Local Color:
ical Legal Studies and the Law of Race Relations, 25 SANDmoL. REV. 1043 (1988).
86 On conununitarian claims to liberty, see generally TRAKMAN, supra note 56, ch. 3.
Interestingly, the minority critique itself draws from communitarian values in challenging
liberal values. For example, Alex Johnson critiques liberal values thus:
[ln the writings of communitarians, one can identify a number of arguments that
attempt to explain why the liberal view of the self is inadequate: the liberal view of the
self (1) is empty; (2) violates our self-perceptions; (3) ignores our embeddedness in
communal practices; (4) ignores the necessity for social confirmation of individual
judgments; and (5) pretends to have an impossible universality or objectivity.
Johnson, supra note 69, at 2055.
87 Charles Taylor, Hegel: History and Politics, in LBERALIsM AND ITS CRrrics 182
(Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984).
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difference.88 These images are expressed affirmatively, in protecting the right
of each discrete comnity to express its distinct identity, beyond the right of
the individual to assert his liberty against the state.89 Communal liberty is
affirmed positively in promoting self-empowerment through communal
empowerment. It is preserved negatively in redressing threats to liberty, such
as threats to the liberty of African Americans who are denigrated on account of
race.
90
In its most enlightened form, communal liberty embodies the "shared
values of a civilized social order ... the essential lessons of civil, mature
conduct." 91 It is affirmed in its capacity to perpetuate relations of trust and
mutual respect among individuals from different communities. It is preserved
negatively, in redressing the communal harm suffered by those who were
denied liberty historically and seek redress on account of its ongoing
violation. 92
88 Liberty that underscores the right to be both different and recognized for that
difference inheres in the affirmative action debate. See Alan D. Freeman, Racism, Rights
and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Cntical Legal Essay, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 295 (1988); Alan D. Freeman, Legitiing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Oitical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv.
1049 (1978); Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal
Academia, 199ODuKEL. REV. 705.89 This protection accorded ethnic, racial, and religious communities includes the
individual. On such community protection in international law, see S. James Anaya, The
Capacity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims, 75 IOWA L.
REV. 837 (1990). Professor Anaya argues in favor of affirming the liberty of ethnic
historical communities, as well as those who have suffered oppressive treatment contrary to
international law governing human rights. Id. at 838-44. Arguably, international law
warrants a wide protection of the right to self-determination. The charter of the United
Nations explicitly aims "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and to take other appropriate
measures to strengthen universal peace." U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 2. However, the principle
of self-determination has been highlighted by the International Court of Justice only as an
"operative right to the decolonization of non-self-governing territories." Western Sahara,
1975 LCJ. 12, 121 No. 61 (Oct. 16).
90 On these negative and positive images of communal liberty, see generally Adeno
Addis, IndIndualism, Conmunharanism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 66 NOTRE
DAMmL. REV. 1219 (1991).
91 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). Rodney Smolla
remarked to similar effect: "Only through communal living... may men achieve virtue."
Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assuapdons About Racist and Sedst
Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. RLy. 171, 173 (1990).
92 On the importance of this communal identity, see Ronald R. Garet, Community and
Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1001 (1983). See generally MIcHAEL
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Both the liberty to speak and the liberty from speech are attributes of
communal liberty. The liberty to speak consists of the communal means by
which individuals convey their opinions, thoughts, and ideas to others. The
liberty from speech encompasses the communal means by which that liberty to
speak is constrained in the interests of those who are subjugated by speech. 93 It
is in weighing the liberty to speak against the liberty from speech that the
communal perimeters of liberty are determined. It is in perfecting the balance
between the two that speech is rendered the most "uninhibited, robust and
wide-open." 94
IV. A COMMUN1TARIAN VIEWPOINT
Liberal democracy is only possible if people feel bound to the state by "ties
derived from a common dwelling place with its associations, from common
memories, traditions and customs, and from the common ways of feeling and
thinking which a common language and still more a common literature
embodies."9 5
Communitarian thought holds that the nature of rights ought to be
determined in light of their contribution to communal life.96 Free speech is
valuable, then, because it contributes to the continuity of family; social, and
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMrTS OF JUSTIcE (1982). The nature of communal identity
is a frequent topic of discourse in Canada. See JoHN WEINSTEmN, ABORIGiNAL SELF-
DETERmiNATION OFF ALAND BASE (1986); Evelyn Kallen, Ethnicity and Collective Rights in
Canada (1981), in ETHNIC CANADA 38 (Leo Driedger ed., 1987); Khayyam Z. Paltiel,
Group Rights in the Canadian Constitution and Aboriginal Claims to Self-Determination, in
CONTEMPORARY CANADIAN PoLmIcs: READINGS AND NOTEs 26 (Robert I. Jackson et al.
eds., 1987). See generally VERNON VAN DYKE, HUMAN RIGHTS, ETHNICrrY, AND
DISCRIMINATION (1985); Darlene M. Johnston, Native Rights as Collective Rights: A
Question of Group Seif-Preservation, 2 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 19 (1988); Michael
McDonald, Should Communities Have Rights? Reflections on Liberal Indiidualism, 4 CAN.
J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 217 (1991).
93 On the communal nature of liberty in relation to hate speech, see, among others,
Thomas L Emerson, Towards a General Theory of the Fist Amendment, 72 YALE LJ. 877
(1963). But see ROBERT N. BELLAH E AL., HABrrS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND
COMMrrMENT IN AMERIcAN LIFE 153-54, 282-83 (1985).
94 Justice Brennan enunciated these words in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254,270 (1964).
95 THOMAS H. GREEN, LECTURES ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITcAL OBLIGATION 130-
31 (1941).
96 See generally Stephen A. Gaudbaum, Law, Politics and the Caims of Conmunity,
90 MICH. L. REV. 685 (1992); Staughton Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1417
(1984).
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religious life, not because it promotes some abstract good.97 The rationale is
twofold: there is virtue in preserving a community identity9" and that identity
ought to inform the rights of those who interact within the community,
including the individual. 99
This communitarian ideology is readily applied to free speech.100 First,
communitarian thought retreats from the view that free speech necessarily has
an a priori meaning that is culturally neutral. This enables speech to be
analyzed in light of the cultural values of the community in which it arises and
upon which it has an impact. Second, communitarian thought is able to
contextualize free speech in light of cultural history. This facilitates a
reasonable assessment of, say, the history of racism in American literature101
9 7 See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
IDENTITY (1989).
98 On the virtue of preserving the identity of minorities, see AREND LIPHART,
DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION (1977); PROTECTION OF
ETHNIC MINORITIES: COMPARATNIE PERSPECrIVES, supra note 61; Liebman, supra note 61.
99 See, e.g., Allen E. Buchanan, Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism,
99 ETHICS 852 (1989); Amy Gutman, Conmuinitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 308 (1985); Michael McDonald, Should Communities Have Rights? Reflections
on Liberal Individualism, 4 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 217 (1991). On the communitarian
perspective in general, see WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIMERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES,
AND DI rrY IN THE LIBERAL STATE (Douglas MacLean ed., 1992); MARY ANN
GLENDON, RiGHTs TALK: THE IMPovERIsHmENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 15 (1991);
ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988); Mary Ann
Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Centwy Constitutions, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN
STATE, supra note 3, at 519; Peter Weston, The Rueful Rhetoric of Rights, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 977 (198).
100 It should be emphasized that, while communitarian thought has not centered on the
free speech debate, its application to that debate follows the principles repeatedly articulated
by its proponents. See infra part VI.
10 1 For a history of racism directed primarily at African Americans, see THE BLACK
EXPERIENCE IN AmpRCA: SELECTED ESSAYS (James Curtis & Lewis L. Gould eds., 1970);
DONALD BOGLE, TOMS, COONS, MULATrOES, MAMMIES, AND BUCKS: AN INTmRRErATVE
HISTORY OF BLACKS IN AMEmCAN FILMS (1973); IMAGES OF BLACKS IN AMERCAN CULTURE:
REFERENCE GUIDE TO INFORMATION SOURCES (Jessie C. Smith ed., 1988); WNHROP D.
JORDON, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATrruDEs TOwARDS THE NEGRO, 1550-1812
(1968); WILLIAM L. VAN DEnURG, SLAVERY AND RACE IN AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE
(1984); Alan W.C. Green, "Jim Crow," "Zip Conn": The Northern Origins of Negro
Minstrelsy, 11 MASS. REV. 385 (1970); 1. Stanley Lemons, Black Stereotypes as Reflected
in Popular Culture, 1880-1920, 29 AM. Q. 102 (1977). For racism and Native Americans,
see generally ROBERT F. BERKHOFER, JR., THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN: IMAGES OF THE
AMERICAN INDIAN FROM COLUMBUS TO THE PRESENT (1978); NAOMI CALDWELL-WOOD &
LISA A. MrrrEN, I Is NOT FOR INDIAN: THm PORTRAYAL OF NATIVE AMERICANS IN BOOKS
FOR YOUNG PEOPLE (1991); ROY H. PEARCE, SAVAGISM AND CIVILIZATION: A STUDY OF THE
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or the impact of racism upon the immigration practices of the American
state. 1°2 Third, communitarian thought allows speech to be evaluated in terms
of the culture of discrete communities. For example, it enables racist speech to
be appraised in terms of the values and practices of, say, the Ku Klux Klan and
African Americans who both happen to live in Montgomery, Alabama. Finally,
communitarian thought enables liberty to be applied to multifold communities,
not limited to racial and ethnic minorities.103
Communitarian thought is useful in mediating between individual and
community conceptions of rights. For example, it accepts that individuality is
central to the development of cultural identity.104 But communitarians also
recognize that culture informs free will differently in different context. 10 5 This
allows them to evaluate free speech in light of its impact upon personhood,
viewed through the prism of cultural relations. 106
Despite these virtues, communitarian thought remains flawed in relation to
free speech. Faced with an apparent conflict between individual rights and
community interests, the communitarian response is either to raise individual
rights above community interests, or to treat community interests as a loose
INDIAN AND THE AMERICAN MIND (rev. ed. 1965); RoBERT A. WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN
IDNIN WEsTERNLEGAL THouGHT (1990); Robert H. Keller, Jr., Hostle Language: Bias
in Historical Writing About American Indian Resistance, 9 1. AM. CuLTURE 9 (Winter
1986).
102 Discrimination in immigration is most evident in respect of Asian Americans. See,
e.g., MturuAL IMAGES: ESSAYS IN AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS (Akira Iriye ed., 1975);
RONALD TAKAK, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS
(1989); RICHARD A. THOMPSON, THE YELLOWPERIL 1890-1924 (1979).
10 3 See generally Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the
Foundational Paradigms of Free Speech, 40 UCLA L. REV. 103, 116 (1992).
104 To some extent liberals, like Ronald Dworkin, concern themselves with a "liberal
community." A liberal community, in effect, consists of a community of habituated and
self-determining individuals. However, that community also embraces the solidarity that
individuals bring to one another through their mutual associations. See, e.g., Dworkin,
supra note 61.
105 See, e.g., CYNTHIA H. ENLOE, ETHNIC CoNFLICr AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
15-25 (1973); H.M. KALLEN, CULTuRE AND DEmOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 41-45
(1924); R.A. SCHERMERHORN, CoMPAmTPE ETHNIC RELATIONS: A FRAmEWORK FOR
THEORY AND RESEARCH 51 (1970); Michael Novak, Cultural Pluralism for Individuals: A
Social Vision, in PLURALISM IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 34-36 (Melvin M. Tumin et al.
eds., 1977). On the tensions between liberalism and democracy within a liberal democracy
in general, see generally C.B. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
(1977); C.B. MACPHERSON, THE REAL WORLD OF DEMOCRACY (1966).
106 Challenges to speech along communitarian lines are most evident in relation to
group libel laws. See generally Tanenhaus, supra note 50; Campisano, supra note 50; Note,
A Conmmunitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws, supra note 50.
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infrastructure around which individuals exercise their rights. 107 Neither
approach is tenable simply because neither provides any means of choosing
between them. Either communitarian interests constitute an anecdotal additive
to individual rights; or they have some indeterminate influence upon those
rights. Communitarian scholars generally fail to provide a solution.
A transformative vision of free speech, in contrast, can accommodate both
individual and community interests. For example, it can conceive of the right to
free speech in accordance with the legal responsibilities that arise between those
who speak and those who are likely to be affected by speech. In this way, a
transformed conception of free speech can mediate between the social and
cultural practices of those who assert the right to speak and those who claim to
be harmed by it. 108
V. A TRANSFORMATIVE ALTERNATIVE: RESPONSIBIL1TIF_
A transformative conception of free speech maintains that legal
responsibilities inhere within the right to speak itself. These responsibilities are
owed variously to the state, civil society, and discrete communities. They are
determined in light of social properties that are attributed to rights themselves.
For example, the individual's responsibility for using speech that is treasonous
is an attribute of his right. In exercising his right to speak, he is expected not to
do so in a treasonous manner. 109
A transformative conception of free speech also imposes responsibilities
upon the state. For example, the state is responsible to preserve liberty from
state intrusion and to safeguard the democratic ends to which that liberty is
107 The somewhat permeable proposition advanced by communitarian scholars, like
Charles Taylor, that individual rights serve as first order rights, while community rights
operate at the second order, deals only cursorily with the inevitable conflict that arises
between them. See, e.g., TAYLoR, supra note 97.
108 Compare TRAKMAN, supra note 56, ch. 3 ith Karst, Equality and Cormunity,
supra note 56. Professor Karst argues further that communities that are abused by other
communities are denied equality, while individuals who are denied equal standing with
other individuals are also the subject of unequal treatment. Id. at 186-87. See generally
Karst, Paths to Belonging, supra note 56; Sugarman, supra note 56.
109 The argument, here, is that the right of free speech itselfincludes a responsibility
for that right. This argument is consistent with the assumption that the right to speak is
contingent upon the social interest in that right. It is apparent, too, in the natural law thought
upon which the dignitarian paradigm underlying free speech is grounded. See supra text
accompanying note 42; see also Emerson, supra note 93, at 909-13. But see R. BELLAR LT
AL., HABrrS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERIcAN LiFE 153-54,
282-83 (1985).
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directed.110 Applied to free speech, it is responsible to ensure that speech does
not defeat the ends of peace and public order. This responsibility, arguably,
includes its obligation to discourage the use of speech that divests racial and
ethnic minorities of self-respect.'11
The transformation of free speech is accomplished by recognizing that
liberty is determined by an interrelated set of social and legal relations. Among
these is the relationship between rights, not limited to free speech, and
responsibilities arising from those rights. "A political order in which rights
consciousness is highly developed is prone to instability unless counterbalanced
by norms of duty, obligation and responsibility."112 Wesley Hohfeld, writing
over fifty years ago, offered a partial transformation of rights along these lines.
He situated rights, not simply in relation to duties, but as one of four basic
legal relations, their opposites and correlates." 3 While rudimentary in nature,
his approach provides a useful starting point in which to construct legal
responsibilities to accompany rights."14
110 See TRAKMAN, supra note 56, ch. 2.
111 On the relationship between individual rights and community interests in relation to
ethnic minorities, see generally VAN DYKE, supra note 92; Johnston, supra note 92;
McDonald, supra note 92.
112 A.C. Cairns & C. Williams, Constitutionalism, Qtizenship and Society in Canada.
An Overview, in CONSTrUiONALIsM, CrzENsHwP AND SOCIETY IN CANADA 1, 3 (A.C.
Cairns & C. Williams eds., 1985).
113 Hohfeld, Rights, supra note 12; see also Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Aplied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE LJ. 710 (1917) [hereinafter
Hohfeld, Conceptions].
114 Hohfeld's schema is useful in transforming the right to free speech. At the same
time, his schema is deficient in not imposing any corresponding obligation or responsibility
upon the right-holder.
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Hohfeld's conception of basic legal relations is depicted as follows: 115
Basic Legal Opposite/
Relation Contradictory Correlative
Ri~~t No-Righ Dt
A's claim A's lack of B's duty to
against B claim against B respect A's claim
Privilee Duty
A's freedom A's duty to B's lack of
from B's claim respect B's claim claim againstA
Power Disability Liability
A's affirmative A's lack of B's subjection to
control over affirmative control A's control over
a legal relation over a legal relation a legal relation
with respect to B
Immunity Liability Disability
A's freedom A's subjection to B's lack of control
from B's power B's control over over a legal relation
a legal relation with respect to A
Hohfeld's idea is that the rights and privileges of each member of society
are balanced against the rights and privileges of others.11 6 A gets a right for B's
duty owed to A, and A gets a privilege for B's lack of a claim.117 Applied to
free speech, A has a right to speak which B has the duty to respect, or A has a
privilege in respect of which B lacks a claim against A. A has a corresponding
duty to respect B's rights, such as B's rights to personal security. A also has no
claim in respect of B's privileges.
115 The schema has four basic legal relations: rights, privileges, powers, and
immunities. These, and the other underlined terms within the table above, are Hohfeld's.
See Hohfeld, Rights, supra note 12.
116 See Hohfeld, Conceptions, supra note 113, at 745 ("[A] large number of
fundamentally similar rights resid[e] in one person; and any one of such rights has as its
correlative one . . . of a large number of. . . fundamentally similar duties residing
respectively in many persons."); Hohfeld, Rghts, supra note 12, at 317 ("[Tihe deeper the
analysis, the greater becomes one's perception of fundamental unity and harmony in the
law.").
117 A also has a power for B's disability and an immunity on account of B's lack of
control over A.
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Hohfeld's legal relations are appropriately framed in two situations.118 In
situation 1, the speaker has a right which the listener has a duty to respect and
the state has the duty not to infringe. In situation 2, the speaker has a duty to
respect the listener's right, while the state has a duty not to infringe that right.
The relationship between speaker, listener and state is characterized
diagrammatically as follows:119
Speaker (S) Listener (L) State (F)
situation I S has a right L has a duty P has a duty
againstL to respect not to infringe
the right of S right of S
situation 2 S has a duty L has a right P has a duty
to respect against S not to infringe
the right ofL right of L
These situations are readily applied to free speech. In situation 1, the
listener has a duty to respect the speaker's right. In situation 2, the speaker has
a duty not to infringe the listener's right. The two situations are mutually
interdependent. So long as the speaker does not violate the listener's right, the
speaker's right remains intact and the listener has a duty to respect it. So long
as the listener does not violate the speaker's right, the listener's right prevails
and the speaker has a duty to respect it.
Hohfeld's schema of basic legal relations is dynamic in several respects. It
extends basic legal relations beyond rights stricto sensu, to include powers,
privileges, and immunities. It conceives of such relations in light of their
correlatives and opposites; and it imposes a duty upon the state not to violate
them. In this respect, Hohfeld's schema extends legal relations significantly
beyond the negative relationship between the individual and the state.120
118 Hohfeld likely conceived of freedom of speech as a privilege, not a right. This is
consistent with the dignitarian assumption that speech is a privilege that inheres in
personhood itself. See supra note 115 and accompanying table. For convenience and in the
interests of simplicity, freedom of expression will be treated as a right in the analysis below.
This right is variable in nature; it is subject to community norms; and it varies in light of the
particular relationship between the parties.
119 This diagrammatic representation is a general extrapolation from Hohfeld's
analysis. It does not attempt to exhaust the analytical possibilities that arise under his
conception of legal relations. In addition, it treats free speech as a right, rather than as a
privilege. See supra note 118.
120 On this negative relationship, see TRAKMAN, supra note 56, ch. 2.
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Despite its virtues, Hohfeld's structure of rights remains limited. First, it
fails to evaluate the content of rights, privileges, and duties. If a speaker has a
right or privilege to speak, the listener has a correlative duty or no-claim,
regardless of the content of each relationship. Second, Hohfeld's schema does
not take account of the social and cultural conditions that surround rights,
privileges, and duties. To use Richard Delgado's phraseology in relation to
racist speech, it does not pay regard to the social conditions under which
"words wound" and racist speech impinges upon race relations. 121
Third, Hohfeld's schema assumes that A's rights are unlimited so long as
they do not violate the rights of B, or others like B. This fails to recognize the
interests of B and others like B that are not expounded as rights. For example,
A has no duty to respect B's interest in preserving a distinct cultural identity, so
long as B's interest is not protected by a right or privilege. Once it is found that
A has an unqualified right to speak, A is free to use that right to humiliate B.
The justification for passing over B's interest falling short of a right is to
assume that, once A's right or privilege is found to exist, B automatically has a
correlative duty or no-claim. 122 This ignores the social conditions under which
A exercises his right or privilege, as when he uses speech to injure B. It also
passes over the potential harm to the public that can arise from the use of such
an unqualified right or privilege.123
Despite its pitfalls, Hohfeld's conception of legal relations can be rendered
transformative by acknowledging that the nature and content of rights and
privileges depends upon the social conditions under which they are
exercised.124'This can be accomplished by imposing an internal restriction
upon Hohfeld's legal relations, especially but not exclusively upon rights. This
121 See Delgado, supra note 66.
122 The fact that B's competing interests are not protected in Hohfeld's schema is
complicated by the further assumption that everyone has comparable rights. This
assumption is doubtful in ignoring imbalances in the nature of correlatives and opposites.
123 This limitation in Hohfeld's schema arises in the analytical requirement that B
respect A's right and that A respect B's right, so that the right of each constitutes the
necessary duty of the other.
124 On the virtue of orienting rights around a social context that includes
responsibilities, see TRAKMAN, supra note 56, ch. 2. In this Article, I argue that legal
relations that are expressed solely through a conflict between particular parties, passing over
the mediatory potential of a wider social context. The value of recasting rights in the context
of expansive duties and responsibilities was recently asserted by the Honorable Mr. Justice
Frank lacobucci of the Supreme Court of Canada. See Frank Lacobucci, The Evolution of
Constitutional Rights and Correspond'ng Liberties: The Leon Ladner Lecture, 26 U.B.C. L.
REV. 1, 14-19 (1992). Arguably, his approach readily applies to the reconstitution of free
speech.
1995]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
internal restriction could be called a responsibility.25 Rather than A having a
right or privilege to freedom of expression that is unqualified within its own
sphere, A could have a right only by accepting a responsibility towards those at
whom that speech is directed, or who are proximately affected by it.126 A's
right would then attract a responsibility to respect interests that are not
protected by rights, such as the cultural interest of people like B not to be
harmed by words of hate. The nature of A's responsibility, in turn, would
depend upon the nature of A's rights and the effect of their exercise upon the
interests of people like B.
The schema proposed below modifies Hohfeld's basic relations in four
primary respects. First, in addition to the value that is accorded A's
responsibility to respect the rights of others like B, A also has a responsibility
to respect interests that are not represented as rights. These interests include,
among others, the interest in preserving one's ethnic distinctiveness. Second,
A's responsibility is a legal responsibility. It is owed not only to B, but also to
others like B. For example, if B is an African American, A conceivably owes a
responsibility to other African Americans whose interests are detrimentally
affected by A's speech. Third, the nature of A's responsibilities vary in
accordance with the manner in which A exercises his rights in relation to
others, like B. For example, A ordinarily assumes a greater responsibility for
persistently using racist epithets to degrade African Americans than when he
does so unconsciously on a single occasion. Fourth, the rights and
responsibilities of both A and B hinge upon the social context. Applied to racist
speech, that context encompasses, inter alia, the history of racism, its
manifestation in speech and its impact upon particular communities or
individuals. 127
125 The restriction is "internal" and "positive" in nature. It grants A the right to free
speech so long as he assumes a responsibility to exercise that right in a manner that ensures
continuing social dialogue. The purpose is to insure that each party, including speaker and
listener, "gets" and "gives" something. An "external" and "negative" restriction, in
contrast, gives A the right to speak unless his speech impairs the right of another or others.
12 6 Similarly, B has a responsibility to respect A's privilege to speak as an interpleader
before a court of law. B, in turn, is disabled by the court's power to point to A's guilt,
unless A possesses some form of immunity.
12 7 On this history of racism, see supra text accompanying notes 101-02.
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This modified construction of legal relations is depicted graphically as
follows: 128
Basic Legal Relation
Legal
Advantage Responsibility Opposite Correlative
Right A's claim A's responsibility A's lack B's obligation
against B to respect B's of claim to respect
(and others') against B A's claim
interests in the
exercise of
A's right
Privilege A's freedom A's responsibility A's obligation B's lack
from B's claim to respect B's to respect of claim
(and others) B's claim against A
interests in the
exercise of
A's freedom
These modified legal relations are best explained in relation to racist
speech. The first step is to identify the social context that surrounds the rights,
responsibilities, or no-rights of the parties. For example, the context
surrounding racist speech takes account of a particular history of organized
racism, its embodiment in religious, social, and cultural institutions, and its
incorporation into private and public law. That context also encompasses the
social, cultural, and religious interests of the parties. For example, the speech
rights of KKK members reflects their racist culture, including its subordinating
effect on the cultures of others, such as that of African Americans living in the
rural South. Finally, an examination of the social context helps to determine the
nature of responsibilities owed by the parties. For instance, the extent to which
KKK members are responsible for racist speech depends upon their position of
wealth, power, and influence vis-a-vis the target of their speech. 129
12 8 Responsibilities would attach to powers and immunities as well. However, the goal
here is not to identify the full spectrum of legal relations, but to decide how rights like
freedom of speech ought to be construed. On powers and immunities within Hohfeld's
schema, see supra note 115 and accompanying table.
129 On the relationship between the KKK and racism, see supra note 68.
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This transformative conception of legal relations has the advantage of
taking account of the specific relationship between the parties. For example, the
character of A's responsibility for racist speech depends upon the nature of his
intent, as well as his reasonable foresight of the effect of his speech upon the
intended audience. 130 The underlying assumption is that his responsibility
hinges upon the extent to which he intends the exercise of his right to have a
destructive effect upon others, or he acts in reckless disregard of that effect,
and the degree to which he reasonably foresaw the ensuing harm. 131 It follows
that, the more deliberately or recklessly A uses racist speech to degrade African
Americans and the more readily he foresees ensuing harm, the greater will his
responsibility likely be for that speech. 132
This is not to claim that, once A has violated a responsibility towards
others like B, A's speech is per se unconstitutional. The constitutionality of A's
conduct depends upon the determination that A has violated his responsibilities
in such a manner, or to such an extent, that his speech ought to be treated as
unconstitutional. Such a determination is made, for example, when the state
treats speech as "fighting words" and denies those words constitutional
protection.' 33 In contrast, speech might be constitutionally protected, but still
restricted. For example, A's speech might be permitted, but subject to
restrictions because it threatens to disturb the peace. In such circumstances, A's
130 As a working definition, racial communities consist of racial or ethnic groups that
are united constitutively, through historical affiliation, and instrumentally, through their
decision to associate. Constitutive affiliations stem, inter alia, from ancestral association,
family, and kinship. Instrumental affiliations develop through choice. Racial minorities
affiliate constitutively, in their historical, sociological, and familial roots. They also
associate, instrumentally, through the choice of their members to identify with, preserve,
and develop those roots beyond their constitutive origins. On the distinction between
constitutive and instrumental affiliations among communities, see MICHEAL . SANDEL,
IBEALISM AND nLIMIrs oFJusTIcE 147-50 (1982). See generally BELLAH Lr AL., supra
note 93.
131 Courts would be unlikely to have difficulty applying this approach to speech rights
as the analysis is quite consistent with common law reasoning.
132 It is noteworthy that Canada has incorporated a hate speech provision in its
criminal code that imposes responsibility upon those who express hatred towards others. See
Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 319 (1985) (Can.). "Every one. who, by
communicating statements, other than in private conversation, wilfully promotes hatred
against any identifiable [racial, religious, or ethnic] group..." shall be guilty of a criminal
offense. Id. For an interpretation of this provision before the Supreme Court of Canada, see
Regina v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731; Regina v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697;
Canadian Human Rights Comm'n v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892; Regina v. Andrews,
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 870. See generally TRAKMAN, supra note 56, ch. 2.
133 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); see also
supra note 75.
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words are not per se unconstitutional, but he is still accountable for using them
contrary to law. Of course, A might also be held accountable directly to B in
private law, as when A employs speech to slander B. 134
The state also assumes responsibilities for speech in fulfilling its mandate
to maintain the well-being of civil society.135 This includes a responsibility to
redress the social ills of racism, sexism, and other forms of bigotry, including
bigoted speech. Whether this responsibility arises under the rubric of public
policy, social morality, or good government, the state is obliged to redress
conduct that interferes with the public order. Arguably, its mandate also
encompasses regulating racist speech that disrupts communal life. 136
This transformative approach expands upon the context surrounding legal
relations which is dynamic in nature. For example, it ensures that the rights
and responsibilities of A and B depend upon their discrete relationship, viewed
in the context of their social, cultural, and political environment. It maintains,
further, that this context encompasses legal relations between community and
community and between community and individual, not just between individual
and state. This expansive social context has the advantage of allowing rights
and responsibilities to be conceived in light of personal and interdependent
relations, as distinct from a priori ones. Applied to racist speech, the
transformative goal is to evaluate racist speech in light of the personal identity,
integrity, and self-esteem of speaker and target, envisaged in light of the
cultural background of both.
134 On the relationship between free speech and community harm in private law,
notably in group libel suits, see Jeffrey S. Bromie, Note, Group Defamation: Five Guiding
Factors, 64 TEX. L. REV. 591 (1985); Note, A Communitarian Defense of Group Libel
Laws, supra note 50.
135 The state might assume a direct responsibility on grounds of public order and
social morality, or a vicarious responsibility in order to protect the interests of the listener.
For example, it might assume a direct responsibility to redress racist speech that threatens to
produce violence against the public interest. It might assume vicarious responsibility in
trying to protect a particular listener from becoming the target of a vicious verbal attack that
is likely to stifle any reasonable response.
136 On the regulation of racist speech, see supra notes 70-85 and accompanying text.
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This transformative construction of legal relations,
listener, and state, is depicted graphically as follows:
Speaker (S) Listener (L)
involving speaker,
State (F)
situation I S has a right L has a duty P has a duty
againstL to respect the not to infringe
right of S the right of S
Salso has a Palso has a
responsibility responsibility
to respect the to promote 's
interests of L responsibility to L
in the exercise of
L's right
situation 2 S has a duty L has a right P has a duty
to respect the to be protected not to infringe
right of L from the exercise the right of L
of S's right
Lalso has a Palso has a
responsbility responsibility
to respect the to ensure L's
interest of S right is not
in the exercise oppressive to S
of S's right
In the first situation, the speaker exercises a right to speak, which the
listener has the duty to respect. However, the speaker also has a responsibility
to respect the listener's interest in the exercise of the listener's rights. For
example, the speaker is obliged to respect that racist speech can subvert the
dignity and self-esteem of the listener. The state has both the duty not to
infringe the rights of the speaker and the responsibility, to promote the
speaker's responsibility towards the listener.
In the second situation, the listener has an interest in being protected from
speech that degrades him. He is also responsible to respect the speaker's right
to speak. This infers that, while the listener has an interest in not enduring the
indignity of racist speech, he is also responsible not to have a chilling effect
upon speech simply because it addresses racial issues. The state, in turn, is
responsible to mediate between the target's right not to be degraded by speech,
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and the target's responsibility not to try to repress speech simply because the
target dislikes it. 137
This mediation between rights and responsibilities might well lead to the
dilution of "all-or-nothing" rights claims in favor of modified alternatives. For
example, social and political consensus might evolve around the virtue of
treating freedom of speech as a fundamental attribute of a free society.
However, further consensus might require that such freedom be exercised
responsibly in the context of distinct legal relations. This might induce both
dignitarians and instrumentalists to acknowledge that free speech is essential in
a democratic state, but that unrestrained speech can give rise to huge social
costs in provoking, say, racial conflict. 138 It might also lead to remedies that
affirm the right to speak precisely because it is the subject of responsibilities.
For example, the speaker might be entitled to employ racist speech, but only if
he assumes a particular responsibility on account of that speech. 139
Rendering rights contingent upon responsibilities can also mediate between
traditional and non-traditional paradigms governing free speech. For example,
dignitarians well might accept that the targets of hate speech have a distinctly
moral interest in not being subject to unmitigated degradation. Critics of this
dignitarian paradigm might concede that the diligent protection of free speech
has communal value. Both might take cognizance of the fact that freedom of
expression is best protected in light of the identity, integrity, and self-esteem of
speaker and listener, not one at the expense of the other.
This transformation of the rights discourse also might lead to innovative
and equitable results. For example, in the famous Skokie case,140 the court
upheld the rights claim of neo-Nazis to march through a predominantly Jewish
137 It should be noted that the listener has other means by which to redress racist
speech, varying from civil suit to adverse speech. For example, the target's resort could
range from response in the proverbial market-place-in-ideas, to defamation or group libel
suit. These other means might apply in place of, or in addition to, constitutional litigation.
See also supra note 106.
138 For a telling account of the pain that racism, including racist speech, has caused
and continues to cause ethnic minorities, see Lawrence, supra note 66; Toni M. Massaro,
Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV.
211 (1991); Toni M. Massaro, Legal Storytelling: Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule
of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2099, 2100 (1989); Matsuda, supra
note 66.
139 On such constraints in the famous Skode case, see infra notes 140-42 and
accompanying text.
140 Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 366 N.E.2d 347 (11.
1977), affd in part and rev'd in part, 373 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 1978). The Village of Skokie's
ordinance was challenged seperately in federal court. Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676
(N.D. ILL.), af'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
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neighborhood. 141 Under a reconstituted rights discourse, the court still could
preserve their rights as the embodiment of their freedom of expression.
However, given their plan to march through a predominantly Jewish
neighborhood and the likelihood of conflict arising there between KKK and
militant Jewish groups, the court could subject the exercise of their rights to
appropriate responsibilities. For example, it could stipulate that demonstrators,
supporting or opposed to the KKK, comply with regulations governing orderly
conduct. Or the court could order that the march take place in another
neighborhood where conflict is less likely to arise. 142 Important in this scenario
is that the right to march, viewed in light of responsibilities for its exercise,
remains a right. Responsibilities are owed both by those who wish to march
and those who oppose it; and the state is responsible to mediate among
opposing rights claims in the interests of a free and democratic society.
This reformulation of legal relations gives rise to a modified conception of
rights that includes socially relevant remedies. It displaces ideological extremes
in which speech is sanctified or nullified dogmatically. It denies that speech
invariably promotes the democratic good; and it insists that speech is best
protected when it is evaluated in light of the communal conditions under which
it is exercised.
VI. AN ILLUSTRATION
Under a reconstituted schema of rights and responsibilities, public
institutions, like universities, also assume responsibilities for speech. 143 For
example, universities are responsible to foster a constructive and humane
dialogue among diverse peoples on the basis, inter alia, of free speech. 144
141 On the Skokie case, see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
142 On the activities of neo-Nazis in the United States, see DONALD A. DowNs, NAZIs
iN SKOKE: FREEDOM, CoumuNrry AND THE FrST AMENDmENr (1985); DAvID HAMUN,
THE NAZI SKOKIE CoNFLIcr (1980); Donald A. Downs, Skokie Re ted Hate Group
Speech and the First Amendment, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 629 (1985); GERALD GUNTHER,
The Skokie Controversy: First Amendment Problems in Efforts to Restrain Nazi
Detmnstrations, in INDwvDUAL RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 903 (4th ed. 1986).
143 In some respects, the responsibility of the university to regulate abuse of speech
parallels the responsibility of the state. Just as the state "may punish those who abuse the
constitutional freedom of speech by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to
corrupt public morals, incite to crime, or disturb the public peace," the university is
similarly responsible to maintain the "public peace" on campus. Brown v. Hartlage, 456
U.S. 45, 51 (1982) (quoting 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law §§ 405, 507 (1979)). But
see Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
144 The argument, here, is that publicly funded universities are an integral part of any
democratic environment. They are institutions in which the free exchange of ideas is
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Proactive in nature, that responsibility includes preserving the freedom to
speak. It also encompasses the freedom from speech and the freedom to
reply. 145 Whether a university education is a right or a privilege, it gives rise
to collective responsibilities. Most important among these is the shared
responsibility of teachers, students, and administrators to respect the rights and
privileges of those who interact within it. This shared responsibility is implicit
in the expectation that teaching and learning take place within an atmosphere of
understanding and tolerance; and that behavior which threatens that atmosphere
disrupts the mission of the university itself.146
Speech responsibilities are implicit in the mission statement of universities
that ground their programs in social and human development.147 For example,
expected to occur. They are also endowed with a public trust to encourage open dialogue
among their membership. They fulfill that trust when they accept their responsibility to
monitor speech that crosses the threshold between a protected and a hateful act. They
derogate from that trust when they dispense with the public welfare in the image of a false
academic freedom.
145 For an ambitious hate speech code that encompasses, among other action, the
reprimand of students, see Huff, supra note 48, at 192. Arguably, combining gentle and
harsh remedies for hate speech allows for a graduated treatment of the problem on
campuses.
146 1 make three assumptions here. First, the university has a historical obligation to
mitigate disruptions in the educational process. See infra text accompanying note 147.
Second, the regulation of racist hate speech promotes, rather than undermines, free speech.
See supra note 144. Third, the regulation of racist speech, properly administered, is
constitutional.
147 On an "educative" value of responsibilities for hate speech set out in hate speech
codes, see text accompanying note 48; Huff, supra note 48, at 192. Huff suggests that
university regulations on hate speech should include three elements:
[F]irst, the restricted epithets must be directed at individuals in traditionally
subordinated groups... second, the restricted hate messages must come in the form of
a hate epithet which intentionally demeans or threatens a target individual's membership
in the traditionally subordinated group ... third, the epithet must occur in the
classroom.., or... must occur in either a dorm or at a university sponsored activity
where the target individual is vulnerable.
Id. at 192-93. Huff adds
[t]hree other features of a university hate epithet regulation .... First, a preface should
be included which states the harm of hate messages and expresses the purposes of the
regulation in terms of the university's mission .... Second ... a first hate epithet
violation should place the perpetrator on probation .... Finally, the university should
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Harvard College, a private institution, maintains that students need some
guidance in achieving this goal-learning through education-and that the
faculty has an obligation to direct them toward the knowledge, intellectual
skills, and habits of thought of educated men and women.148
Similarly, the prospectus for Yale University provides: "Although
educated men and women may never agree about everything that a liberal
education should include, nearly all do agree [that] the propositions below ...
are intended to serve students as guides in their choice of studies." 149
In fulfilling their educative mission, universities also enact hate speech
codes that seek to preserve speech rights and speech responsibilities. 150 They
strive to promote tolerance through education, notably by sensitizing the
university community to ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity. 151 They also
try to redress the pain and misery that hatefulness, including hate speech,
make clear that it is establishing ... substantial new courses and public programs
addressing the nature and injuries of these pernicious practices."
id. at 193-94.
148 HARVARD COLLEGE, Information, in 1993-94 CATALOG at 1 (1993). Interestingly,
Harvard Law School's catalog of Rights and Responsibilities, explains:
By accepting membership in the University, an individual joins a community ideally
characterized by free expression, free inquiry, intellectual honesty, respect for the
dignity of others, and openness to constructive change .... lt is the responsibility of
all members of the academic community to maintain an atmosphere in which violations
of rights are unlikely to occur and to develop processes by which these rights are fully
assured.
HARVARD LAWSCHOOL, Rights and Responsibilities, in 1992-93 CATALOG at 182 (1992).
14 9 YALE UNIVERsrry, supra note 1, at 15.
150 Universities fulfill these responsibilities by disciplining students and faculty who
distort, disrupt, or otherwise interfere with the educative mission of the institution. For
example, Emory University stipulates that it is "not acceptable" to use "coercion, threats,
demands, obscenity, vulgarity, obstructionism, and violence." EMORY UNIVERSITY SCHOOL
OF LAW, University Student Relationships, in 1988-89 CATALOG at 85 (1988). The
University of Richmond provides: "In a community of learning, individual or group
conduct that is unlawful, that disrupts or interferes with the educational process, that causes
destruction of property or otherwise infringes upon the rights of other members of the
University community or of the University itself, cannot be tolerated." UNNvERsrrY OF
RICHMOND LAW SCHOOL, Standards of Conduct, in CATALOG at 30-31 (1986).
151 As the Yale College Programs of Study stresses: "Educated men and women need
a historical perspective on their own times, and that can come only from studying other
civilizations and cultures, either those from which their own culture has developed, or those
different from their own." YALE UNrvERsrrY, supra note 1, at 16.
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cases.152 They are motivated by four considerations: education is a function of
learning; learning is acquired dialectically through the exchange of ideas and
opinions; regulating conduct is necessary so as not to undermine the process of
learning; and regulation is essential to preserve the well-being of the university
as a community. 153
A transformative rights discourse could assist universities to develop a vital
distinction between speech and responsible speech. For example, universities
could insist that the responsibility of the racist speaker varies according to the
extent to which the words used are intended to cause, or have the effect of
152 On the multitude of hate speech codes that arose on university campuses across the
continent in the late 1980s, see BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNvERsrrY OF WIscONsIN,
University of Wisconsin Hate Speech Policy, in PROPOSED ORDER OF THE BOARD OF
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSrY OF WISCONSIN SYSTEM ADOPTING, AMENDING AND
RENUMERING RULES at 12 (June 14, 1989); STANFORD UNIVERSITY STUDENT CONDUCT
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, FUNDAMENTAL STANDARD INTERPRETATION: FR7EE EXPRESSION AND
DISCRIMINATORY HARASSMENT (Apr. 19, 1989), reprinted in Thomas C. Grey, Ovil Rights
vs. 0i! Liberies: The Case of Discrin'natory Harassment, 63 J. IGHER EDUC. 485 app. at
515-16 (1992); UNIVERSITY OF MICmGAN, DISCRIMINATION AND DISCRIMINATORY
HARASSMENT BY STUDENTS IN THE UNIVERsrrY ENVIRONMENT (Apr. 14, 1988). For more
on the Stanford hate speech code, see Grey, supra. On the judicial treatment of such
policies, see UWM Post v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. System, 774 F. Supp.
1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
See generally Katharine T. Bartlett & Jean O'Barr, The Oidlly Cimate on College
Oampuses: An E insion of the "Hate Speech Debate", 1990 DUKE L.J. 574; Peter Byrne,
Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University, 79 GEo. L.J 399 (1991); Henry 1.
Hyde & George M. Fishman, The Collegiate Speech Protection Act of 1991: A Response to
the New Intolerance in the Academy, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 1469 (1991); Darryl Brown, Note,
Racism and Race Relations in the University, 76 VA. L. REv. 295 (1990); Jens B. Koepke,
Note, The Univeity of California Hate Speech Policy: A Good Heart in Ill-Fitting Garb, 12
HASTRGS Comm. & INT. Li. 599 (1990); Evan G.S. Siegel, Comment, Closing the
Carpus Gates to Free Expression; The Regulation of Offensive Speech at Colleges and
Universiies, 39 EMORY LJ. 1351 (1990).
153 These four assertions are appropriately captured in "Proposed Policy on
Discriminatory Harassment," developed at Dalhousie University, Canada:
Freedom of inquiry and of expression are essential freedoms in a university, and
conflicting ideas are a vital feature of university life. These freedoms must not,
however, be exercised in ways which simultaneously deny similar freedom to others or
make their exercise more difficult by creating a hostile environment for work, study or
participation in campus life.
COMMrrrEE TO DEVELOP A POLICY ON RACISM AND SEXISM, PROPOSED POLICY ON
DISCRIMINATORY HARASSMENT, reprinted in DALHOUSIE NEWS, Jan. 5, 1994, at 5.
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causing, indignity. 154 This could also induce universities to devise graduated
degrees of responsibility for hate speech. For example, universities could
require the racist speaker to submit to counseling, to take a course in
multiculturalism, to perform community service, or to resort to some
combination of the above. 155 Only in the case of persistent, unremitting, and
unapologetic speech, might they insist that the racist speaker quit the
university. 156 In this way, debate could shift from whether or not the student or
154 This variable relationship between hate speech and social harm is implicit in the
common law. For example, words of assault "are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)). It is noteworthy that Canada employs a strict liability
standard in its criminal code to regulate hate propaganda. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch.
C-46, § 319 (1985) (Can.). Similarly, the American Law Institute used a similar strict
liability standard in the Model Penal Code section on harassment. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 250.4 (1975).
155 These proposals in favor of multicultural education are premised upon the
assumption that we live in a culturally, ethnically, and racially diverse society; that diversity
improves the quality of public life; while education about tolerance and mutual respect are
worthy attributes of that life. As one commentator poignantly suggested, multicultural
programs are part of
[the conscious effort to be sensitive, both in teacher preparation and in curriculum
construction, to the cultural, religious, linguistic, ethnic, and racial variety in our
national life, in order to (1) produce an educational environment responsive to the needs
of students from different backgrounds, and (2) instill in students mutual understanding
and respect.
Robert K. Fullinwider, Multicultural Education, 1991 U. CH. LEGAL F. 75, 77. See
generally RICHARD E. DAWSON ET AL., POLITcAL SOCIALIZATION: AN ANALYrIC STUDY
141-45 (2d ed. 1977); Charles R; Calleros, Reconciliation of OviI Rights and vil Liberties
After R.A.V. v. City of St. PauL. Free Speech, Antiharass&ent Policies, Multicultural
Education, and Political Correctness at Arizona State University, 1992 UTAH L. REv. 1205,
1221-31.
156 The purpose is to demonstrate the virtue of educating about racism in the first
instance; and to invoke disciplinary measures only in the last resort. The rationale is that
hate speech crosses the threshold between speech that is protected regardless of its content
and speech that is not protected because it is offensive and becomes harmful. Mary Rouse,
Dean of Students at the University of Wisconsin, refers to education about racism as the
"two percent solution." She allocates the following percentages to efforts toward changing
the educational climate on a campus: setting community standards, 30%; education about
diversity, 68%; and discipline, 2%. Mary K. Rouse, The Two Percent Solution, THE
WoMEN's REvmwoFBOoKs, Feb. 1992, at 17.
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faculty member had a right to utter racist words, to a debate over the degree of
responsibility that should accompany that right including the responsibility not
to exercise the right in the manner chosen by the speaker.
This approachtowards free speech is likely both to clarify and develop the
equitable nature of rights. First, the university could insist that, the more basic
the right of speech is agreed to be, the less ought to be the responsibility that
arises from it. For example, it might maintain that a student who critiques
patronage appointments to government constitutes free speech par excellence,
unless that speech constitutes treason. In contrast, it could insist that a student
who uses speech to degrade African or Native Americans in general ought to
be subject to a standard of responsibility that is commensurate with the racist
intent and effect of the speech used.
Second, the university could evaluate the nature of the speaker's
responsibility in light of his particular intent, including the extent to which he
intended to cause a harmful consequence. For example, it might hold that
unintended racism, loosely referred to as "unconscious" racism, leading to only
minor harm should give rise to only minor responsibility. 157 It might impose
heavy penalties when speech is used intentionally or recklessly to malign and
incite violence. 158
15 7 The intention behind, and effect of racist speech is most relevant in relation to the
unconscious use of such speech. First, unconscious expressions of hate, however lacking in
deliberateness, can have devastating effects. Second, those effects can have negative social
consequences, namely, they can lead to communal hurt. See Lawrence, supra note 66.
Arguably, most forms of racist speech fall into the category of reckless speech, as distinct
from intentionally harmful speech. See Tanya K. HernAndez, Note, Bias Oimes:
Unconscious Racism in the Prosecution of "Racially Motivated Violence", 99 YALE L.J
845, 846 (1990); see also Joseph M. Fernandez, Bringing Hate Crime into Focus-The Hate
Cdne Statistics Act of 1990, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. RLv. 261 (1991). On different
manifestations of racism, see Thomas F. Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: The Different
Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 673 (1985); David 0. Sears, Symbolic
Racism, in ELMINATiNG RACiSM 53-84 (Phyllis A. Katz & Dalmas A. Taylor eds., 1988).
See also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1988).
158 While it is difficult to identify the precise nature of harm arising from racist
speech, it is clear that racist speech often is accompanied by racial violence. Interestingly,
the Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith reported 1,685 anti-Semitic incidents,
including speech related conduct, for forty states and the District of Columbia in 1990. This
is the largest number reported over a twelve year audit period. ANTi-DEFAMATION LEAGUE
oF B'NAi B'RrrH, 1990 AuDrr oF ANrI-Smric INcaDENrs 1 (1990). The federal
government, concerned about spiralling racist incidents, has enacted legislation directed at
gathering statistics on such hate crimes. See Hate Crime Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-
275, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 140; see also Massaro, supra note 138. Nor has hate
speech led to violence only against racial and ethnic minorities. For example, the National
Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF) reported alarming statistics of bias-related violence
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Third, the university could count an abdication of responsibility by a right-
holder against him in accordance with the degree of that abdication. For
example, it could insist that a student who persistently uses speech to degrade
racial minorities renounces the benefit of the classroom in which to exchange
ideas. A student who utters a racist comment unconsciously might justifiably be
counseled by a dean of students, without being penalized further. 159
VII. CONCLUSION
Speech is an instrument of social solidarity. In its most perfect form, it
promotes the free and untrammeled exchange in ideas. In its least perfect form,
it suppresses ideas; it stifles social discourse; it provokes violence.
This Article has sought to establish that, to protect speech is to
acknowledge the interdependence that exists between the right to speak and the
responsibility for it. This responsibility is implicit in natural law. It is necessary
to preserve the dignity of the target of speech. It is a central means towards
communal discourse within a democracy. In ignoring this relationship between
the right to speak and the responsibility for it, the traditional doctrine applied to
free speech denies its own roots. In insisting that speech preserves the dignity
of the speaker, it ignores the indignity that racist speech inflicts upon its
victims. In subscribing to a marketplace in hate, it threatens to undermine the
free marketplace in ideas.
against gay and lesbians often commencing with violent language. The Task Force reported
7,031 incidents of anti-gay violence in 1989. See NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE
ANn-VIOLENCE PROicr, Anti-Gay Violence, Victimization and Defanation in 1989, in
ANTI-VIOLENCE PROJECr (1990); see also Note, Developments in the Law-Sexual
Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1508, 1541 (1989). Courts have expressed
alarm at racist outbursts, including violent ones, on university campuses. See UWM Post v.
Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. System, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1167-68 (E.D. Wis.
1991); Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). Academics have
highlighted the correlation between racism and violence on university campuses across the
continent. See Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracisn Rules: Constitutional Narratives in
Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343, 369-71 (1991); see also supra note 152.
159 Interestingly, in developing this Article, the author spoke to a number of Assistant
or Associate Deans for Student Affairs at universities in the United States and Canada.
While a number were opposed to hate speech codes, not one found any problems with
requesting a student accused of racist speech to come to his or her office for a "discussion."
The argument, here, is that such a "request" most certainly is regulatory. Whether couched
as a request or not, the effect is an assertion of hierarchy. The inference is that the conduct
might be the subject of official disapproval. This regulation revolves around the relationship
of anthority that exists between the student and Dean. The fact that the Dean might be
disempowered to impose formal penalties does not deny that regulatory status.
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A transformative conception of free speech evaluates the liberty to speak in
light of the libertyfirom speech. It appreciates that both conceptions of liberty
are necessary to the development of a democratic society.' 60 It knows that,
absent either, society is not likely to be free.
160 This communal nature of liberty as it applies to free speech, also helps to break
down the private/public divide. Just as individuals are responsible pivately for using words
of hate that slander, libel, and defame others, they are also responsible publicly for the
conmumal impact of their words. See supra text accompanying notes 128-30.
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